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PERFECTION AND POSSIBILITY
Brian Leftow
Perfect being theologians try to fill out the concept of God by working out 
what it would take to be perfect—in various respects, or tout court. Jeff 
Speaks’s “The Method of Perfect Being Theology” raises two problems for 
perfect-being thinking. I reply to these.
Perfect being theologians try to fill out the concept of God by working out 
what it would take to be perfect—in various respects, or tout court. Jeff 
Speaks’s “The Method of Perfect Being Theology” raises two problems 
for perfect-being thinking.1 To deal with one, we must distinguish two 
sorts of perfect-being project. The other is a difficulty for any perfect-being 
project.
Kinds of Goodness
In God and Necessity, I outlined a form of perfect-being reasoning this way: 
suppose that God has a valuable property G. Then
Nothing could be a better G . . . than God in fact is. God can be F. God would 
be a better G were he F than were he not F. . . . Suppose now for reductio that 
God is not F. Then God is not as good a G as He could be. So if God is not F, 
it is false that nothing could be a better G than God in fact is. But this is true. 
So, prima facie, God is F.2
Speaks asks what kind of goodness I had in mind:
Some properties are good for me relative to a kind of which I am a member; 
for instance, I’m a member of the kind basketball player, and, relative to that 
kind, it is better for me to shoot baskets every day than not to—that is, I 
would be a better basketball player were I to shoot baskets every day, than 
were I not to. But this . . . property is (not) one it is better for me to have than 
lack, full stop. . . . Hence we might ask whether [perfect being theology] 
employs the kind-relative or the non-kind-relative sense of “good”. . . . If we 
choose the kind-relative notion, then some choices of a kind seem to give the 
wrong results, whereas others (e.g., the kind deity) . . . presuppose a knowl-
edge of the divine nature that we might have wanted perfect being theology 
1Jeff Speaks, “The Method of Perfect Being Theology,” Faith and Philosophy 31 (2014), 
256–266. Hereafter “Speaks.”
2Brian Leftow, God and Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 9–10, quoted at 
Speaks, 258.
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to provide rather than presuppose. If we choose the non-kind-relative no-
tion, then we face the problem that different properties are good for 
me than for, say, a parrot—which makes it seem as though we have 
to specify an object, or class of objects, in order to get results about 
which properties are better to have than lack even in the non-kind-
relative sense. But again . . . some classes of objects will yield the 
wrong results, whereas others (e.g . . . the singleton set containing 
God) will assume the sort of knowledge of God’s properties which 
we want our method to deliver.3
For the sort of argument I gave, the short answer to Speaks’s question is: 
the argument deals in G-relative goodness, whatever G is. It takes as given 
that God is G. It tries only to fill out how He is G. So our knowledge of the 
good-making features for Gs guides us. This sort of argument is part of 
what I call Scriptural perfect being theology, or SPBT. SPBT starts from 
the conception of God given in Scripture, and uses perfect-being thinking 
merely to flesh it out. SPBT starts with a skeleton concept of God, and that 
provides concrete values for G: a person, a knower, etc. We have decent 
intuitions about what makes for a better person, knower, etc., and SPBT 
calls only on these. Now perhaps problems occur within SPBT: perhaps 
what is good for a knower as such isn’t good for a person as such, and if so, 
perhaps what would make God a better knower isn’t a property better to 
have than to lack, full stop.4 But this isn’t a recurrence of Speaks’s problem. 
Speaks offers a dilemma: either some good-making properties are relative 
to the wrong kind, or we avoid this only by assuming illicit knowledge 
of the divine nature. In SPBT, it is not illicit to assume knowledge of the 
divine nature. Rather, we accept that from Scripture. The only question 
is whether God belongs to two kinds, knower and person, whose highest-
degree good-making properties are not compatible. If what is good for a 
knower as such isn’t good for a person as such, then perhaps being a per-
fect knower isn’t compatible with being a perfect person, and one just has 
to figure out what’s most important. This is just the second stage of SPBT, 
as I understand it. The first stage is finding a field of candidate divine 
perfections, properties that would make God a better G. The second is as-
sessing whether they are compatible, and taking measures if they are not.
The other sort of perfect being theology (hereafter PBT) is a pure a priori 
project. This does not start with an agreed list of divine attributes. It tries 
to come up with a concept of God entirely by perfect-being means. In this 
project, as Speaks suggests, we must start by settling the perfect being’s 
kind. How well we get on depends on this. If we can make a case that the 
kind is <person>, the rest then unfolds as in SPBT. It’s a good question 
whether the a priori project can succeed, but I was not attempting that 
project, and so it is a question I will not address here.
3Speaks, 257–258.
4My thanks to a referee for this.
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The Characteristic Argument of Perfect Being Theology
Speaks’s second problem is also aimed at something of mine, but the 
problem applies to all PBT, not just my arguments, and so I prefer to frame 
my discussion in terms of Anselm. In Proslogion 5, Anselm writes,
What then are you, Lord God, than whom nothing greater can be thought? 
. . . the greatest of all things, alone existing through itself, that made all other 
things from nothing. For whatever is not this is less than can be thought. But 
this cannot be thought of you. . . . And so you are . . . whatever it is better to 
be than not to be.5
I take it that Anselm here speaks of a sort of “thinking” in which only 
what is possible “can be thought,” and so his axiom has the force of
1. God = that than which no greater is possible.
For if we do not restrict the “thinkable” to the possible, it will be easy 
to “think” impossible things greater than God—e.g., the being greater 
than the greatest possible or impossible God.6 The Proslogion’s proem tells 
us that the Proslogion will display “unum argumentum” yielding all that 
Christians believe about God, including that He exists. Anselm never says 
just what he understands the “unum argumentum” to be. It might be just 
Anselm’s axiom, (1). But Anselm might instead mean a general form of 
argument involving the axiom. If he does, and this one form of argument 
inter alia yields God’s existence, then Proslogion 2’s “ontological” argument 
is the fullest display of the argument-form, and we should read Anselm’s 
perfect being reasoning as proceeding in parallel: only so do we have one 
form of argument that yields all that Christians believe about God.
If Anselm’s axiom is (1) and the reductio of Proslogion 2 displays his form 
of argument, we might see Proslogion 5 as proceeding as follows:
2. No possible being could be in an intrinsic state greater than God’s 
actual intrinsic state.
Suppose for reductio:
3. God can be F; God would if F be greater than if not F; and God is not 
F.
Then
4. It is possible that something (God) be in an intrinsic state greater 
than God’s actual intrinsic state.
5. (3) is false, by reductio from 2 and 4. So
5F. S. Schmitt, ed., S. Anselmi Opera Omnia, v. 1 (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd. 
1946), 104; my translation.
6I show elsewhere that Anselm does not mean PBT to derive extrinsic properties; see An-
selm’s God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). So at the price of jarring readers, 
I could substitute for (1) the claim that God = that than which no intrinsically greater is pos-
sible. In any case, we should understand (1) with this restriction. 
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6. If God can be F, and God would if F be greater than if not F, then 
God is F.
7. God can be F.
8. God would if F be greater than if not F. So
9. God is F.
If something could be in an intrinsic state greater overall than God’s actual 
state, (1) would not be true. Thus (2) explicates (1). As to (3) and (7), again, 
Proslogion 5 does not say that possibly God is F, but we should read An-
selm as restricting what is thinkable to what is possible.
Possibility Problems
Speaks’s second problem concerns (7).7 Without it, the argument is invalid. 
But with it, he contends, perfect-being reasoning becomes otiose. PBT will 
insist that (1) is necessary. If the natures of being F and not being F are 
necessary, plausibly they necessarily affect God’s greatness just as they 
actually do, and so plausibly (8) is necessary. If S5 is the right logic for 
metaphysical modality, (7) is necessary if possible. On these assumptions, 
it follows that (9) is necessary if possible. If God is F in one world, that 
is because (1), (7) and (8) are true in that world, and on the assumptions 
noted, (1), (7) and (8) are all true in all worlds if true in any. So on present 
assumptions, (7) and (9) are strictly equivalent. If they are, the argument 
seems otiose: any reason we have to accept (7) is itself reason to accept (9), 
without appeal to perfect being considerations.
We can also add a problem Speaks does not raise. Speaks unpacks “God 
would if F be greater than if not F” this way:
10. God is F ☐ → God has greatness of level X,
11. ¬ (God is F) ☐ → God has greatness of level Y, and
12. X >Y.8
If < God is F > is necessary, (11) is a counterpossible. Then (11) is true, but 
on the standard approach to counterpossibles so equally is
¬ (God is F) ☐ → God has greatness of level X + 1.
If that’s true, Anselm’s form of argument kicks in to tell us that after all, 
¬ (God is F). That turns < God is F > impossible. If it is impossible, then 
while (10) is true, so also < God is F ☐ → God has greatness of level X  +  2 >, 
and that flips us back to saying that God is F. It seems that if its results 
are necessary if possible, on the standard approach to counterpossibles, 
Anselm’s procedure becomes unstable, unable to yield even one definite 
result.
7Speaks, 259ff.
8Speaks, 259.
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I have two replies to Speaks’s dilemma. One is this: suppose that Speaks 
is right, and we’ve now learned that any reason we have to believe (7) 
is reason to believe (9). It is perfect being reasoning that has shown us 
this. So perfect being theology is not otiose in our coming to believe (9). 
It is precisely what tells us that our (7)-reasons are (9)-reasons. Any valid 
argument tells us that reasons for its premises are reasons to embrace its 
conclusion. In the dilemma, Speaks in effect holds our reasons to endorse 
(1) and (8) steady, and focuses on our reasons for (7) as making the decisive 
difference vis-à-vis (9). That’s fine. But that one can do that hardly shows 
that the rest of the argument makes no contribution to our accepting (9).
My other reply is a bit more radical. It is that we can treat (1)–(8) as an 
enthymeme, and if we do, (7) is a lemma, not a premise. The hidden bit 
would be this:
13. That God is F passes all tests for possibility that are not part of PBT, 
and
14. (8) and (13) imply (7).
This circumvents Speaks’s dilemma. We get (7) and so render the argu-
ment valid, but perfect-being reasoning justifies (7), and so retains its 
point. Let us now look at (13) and (14).
(13) and (14) go beyond anything Anselm explicitly says. Saying that 
they belong in the argument is a friendly amendment to Anselm, a rea-
sonable suggestion that gets Anselm past an objection. We should also let 
friendship guide how we fill out (13). I suggest that (13) is true just if
13*. the conjunction of < God is F > with any logical, mathematical or 
“secular” necessary truths does not imply the negation of any logi-
cal, mathematical or “secular” necessary truth save as a paradox of 
strict implication.9
Three things here require comment.
• The full development of what makes a truth secular and which 
truths are secular is tricky,10 but the root idea is that such truths are 
not about God and carry no information about God.
9This is not the same claim as that < God is F > is compatible with everything that appears 
a secular necessary truth. It might appear such a truth that possibly there are states of affairs 
with n amount of suffering, where n is a degree too great for a perfectly good, omnipotent, 
omniscient being to allow, and so to co-exist with. PBT may well tell us that such a perfect 
being would necessarily be perfectly good, omnipotent and omniscient. So if we follow PBT 
to the end, we will say that it is not in fact possible that there be n suffering—i.e., that that is 
not in fact a secular necessary truth. It is secular—it carries no information about God—but 
it is not in fact true, and what rules it out is ultimately the character of God. I would have to 
complicate (13) and (13*) to deal with this. For present purposes I need not work this out. The 
final successors to (13) and (13*) would function in my overall argument just as (13) does: the 
difference between them does not matter here.
10See my God and Necessity, 248–252, and for a correction, my “Omnipotence, Evil and 
What’s in God,” European Journal of Philosophy of Religion 6:3 (2014), 58.
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• Some writers see the claim that a proposition does not imply a con-
tradiction as entailing that it is possible, or at least as important 
evidence that it is possible. The “does not imply etc.” part of (13*) 
generalizes from “does not imply a contradiction.” The law of non-
contradiction is not all a proposition must respect if it is to pass all 
non-theistic tests for possibility.
• I say “save as a paradox” etc. for the following reason. If being F is a 
legitimate candidate for perfect-being ascription to God, < God is F > 
is either necessary or impossible. If it is necessary, of course, < God 
is F > in conjunction with any set of necessary truths does not imply 
any impossibility. If < God is F > is impossible, then to pass all non-
theistic tests for possibility, it must respect all non-theistic necessary 
truths. It is impossible that God knows that 2 + 2 = 5, but this fails 
the test in (13*): the impossibility here does not respect all non-the-
istic necessary truth. In contrast, while it might be impossible that 
God is not omnipotent, this impossibility is entirely theistic. In the 
sense of implication at issue in (13*), it carries no implications for 
anything other than God. So it passes the test in (13*). True, if God 
is necessarily omnipotent, <God is not omnipotent> implies every-
thing whatsoever. But it implies all this as a paradox of implication. 
This is the only reason it implies all this, and that is why <God is 
not omnipotent> passes—why in the sense of implication that matters 
for (13*), it carries no implications for things other than God. For if 
we just thought out intuitively what is involved in God’s not being 
omnipotent, we would not infer from this that 2 + 2 = 5 or that eagles 
are mammals. If we abstracted from its impossibility, we would not 
say that it implies these things. Consider the conditional < there are 
no minds → there are no thoughts >. If God exists necessarily, this 
has an impossible antecedent. So the semantics tells us that it is 
equally true that < there are no minds → there are hippopotami >. 
But the claim about hippopotami follows only as a paradox of im-
plication. So when we think about there being no minds, we legiti-
mately ignore the hippopotamus conditional. On the other hand, 
when we think about there being no minds, we do not legitimately 
ignore there being no thoughts. That just seems part of there being 
no minds. There is a substantive connection between the antecedent 
about minds and the consequent about thoughts, and this substan-
tive connection and the semantics overdetermine that conditional’s 
truth. Some impossibilities imply other propositions for more than 
one reason. (13*) tells us in effect that iff < God is F > passes the non-
theistic tests for possibility, there is no substantive connection be-
tween < God is F > and the negation of any logical, mathematical or 
“secular” necessary truth.
The basic thought I want (13*) to explicate is that in evaluating theo-
logical hypotheses by perfect being thinking, we hold everything in the 
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modal realm but theology constant, and the live options are just those that 
“fit” into the modal realm as it actually is.11 The thought is that (13) is true 
just if < God is F > fits in with all “non-theistic” necessary truth. “Save as 
a paradox” rules out any substantive connection between an impossible 
theistic hypothesis and a non-theological impossibility. It does so to keep 
theological hypotheses in an appropriate way disconnected from the 
modal realm I want to hold constant in evaluating them.
We justify (13) or (13*), presumably, as we do candidate possibility-
claims. I intend (13*) not to entail that possibly God is F, for intuitively, 
some theistic impossibilities “fit” in the sense given with non-theistic 
necessary truth: both < God is omnipotent > and its negation “fit” with 
< 2 + 2 = 4 >. If we are to take both < God is F > and its negation as hypoth-
eses to investigate, live candidates PBT must decide between, both must 
appear possible before PBT gets to work, even if one is in fact impossible. 
(13*) sets up the particular sense in which they do—both are “conceivable” 
and appear to be possible given all relevant information from outside PBT, 
as both appear to satisfy (13*). But that I let theistic impossibilities be con-
ceivable or appear possible raises two issues.
One is simple consistency. I said above that Anselm must restrict the 
thinkable to the possible. Now I’m saying that (13) requires a sense of 
“thinkable” which is not restricted to the possible. One wants to say that 
Anselm can’t have it both ways. Well, Anselm thinks he can. Proslogion 
4 distinguishes two ways one can “think” that God does not exist. One 
captures the nature of what one thinks about; let us call it thinkingn. The 
other does not, but remains merely on a superficial verbal level or even 
misunderstands the words being used; let us call it thinkings. In parallel, 
there are two ways to “think” other theistic impossibilities. Being think-
ablen entails being possible. Being thinkables does not. This second, less 
demanding sense is in play in (13) and (13*).
The second matter is this. If we let theistic impossibilities appear pos-
sible, we risk concluding that God has impossible attributes. A dilemma 
seems to loom: either risk this, or let being conceivable or apparently pos-
sible in (13)’s way entail possibility. The latter might seem problematic 
because then < P > is conceivable only if possible, and then if < P > is pos-
sible only if necessary, < P > is conceivable only if necessary: which Speaks 
will say gets us < P > without PBT, just from < P >’s conceivability. I think the 
dilemma is not serious. Neither horn is sharp.
On the one side, the impossibilities we judge conceivable or apparently 
possible will be theistic—claims about divine attributes. These have to be 
live, conceivable, apparently possible hypotheses, else there’s nothing 
for PBT to do comparative work with. And many such theological im-
possibilities obviously are in some senses conceivable. If we let these be 
11Again, this is too simple, in that the modal realm as it actually is may have been shaped 
partly by theological constraints—perhaps it doesn’t contain the possibility of n amount of 
suffering. But again, for present purposes we can ignore this.
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conceivable, the risk that we conclude to impossibilities is just the risk 
that our intuitions about perfection lead us to the wrong theological con-
clusions. We had that risk anyway. So this is no additional problem for 
PBT, and is in that sense cost-free. It is also a risk PBT has no matter how 
“conceivable” be understood, I think.
On the other side, maybe the entailment isn’t so bad. For one thing, I’ve 
already argued that even if things are as Speaks says, perfect being rea-
soning is not otiose. There is also a second reason it would not be otiose. If 
conceivability in the relevant sense entailed possibility entailed necessity 
entailed actuality, it would no longer be a straightforward matter to judge 
whether something is conceivable. If PBT yields < God is F >, necessarily 
God is F. So that God is not F turns out impossible, and so if conceiv-
ability implies possibility, it follows that this was inconceivable all along. 
If P, it turns out inconceivable that ¬ P, even if < ¬ P >’s prima facie claim to 
be conceivable is just as good as < P >’s. So we turn out to need a perfect 
being argument to judge between rival claims to conceivability for < P > 
and < ¬ P >, just as we do to judge between rival claims to possibility. And 
so PBT still has a role.
Now to (14). The thought here is that PBT is a vehicle inter alia for deter-
mining what is possible. For the non-theistic part of logical space, we settle 
our beliefs about what is there (for the most part12) by non-theological 
means. For the theistic part, we use the same non-theological tests we 
apply elsewhere, but that does not suffice to whittle our hypotheses down 
to one. Further, strictly theological tests are needed. PBT provides them. 
Anselm’s axiom is that God is the greatest possible being, and in his eyes, 
“greatest” in some contexts dominates “possible.” Anselm proceeds as if 
there is no chance that independent modal facts could trim God down 
from what PBT says He ought to be, save insofar as he seeks to make sure 
that individual divine attributes are understood in coherent ways and to 
iron out apparent incompatibilities between them. That suggests that An-
selm sees himself as using PBT to discover what a certain portion of the 
modal realm contains, guided in part by logical truths he takes to govern 
the entire modal realm.13 In so doing, he guides part of his modal thinking 
by the axiom that God is the greatest thinkables being, which might be why 
12Again, intolerable levels of evil provide an exception.
13I saw this independently, but this idea also occurs in unpublished work by Mark 
Murphy. Graham Oppy suggests that facts about what is possible are independent of any 
facts about perfect, near-perfect etc. beings, and so it might well be that the most powerful 
possible being is a long way from any intuitively acceptable conception of omnipotence, the 
most knowledgeable possible being a very long way from any intuitively acceptable notion 
of omniscience, etc. (Graham Oppy, “Perfection, near-perfection, maximality, and Anselmian 
Theism,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 [2011], 130). Well, if one is not 
committed to PBT, this might be exactly the view to take, and even those committed to PBT 
should (I think) treat the non-theological bit of the space of possibility this way in practice, 
with the exception of apparent possibilities too bad for a perfect being to permit to be actual.
 Another point here: If Anselm is proceeding as indicated, this might also suggest that 
while Anselm does not explicitly assert (13) and (14), he tacitly assumes them—so that they 
are not mere friendly amendments, but instead bring out implicit assumptions. 
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Proslogion 2 puts his axiom in terms of being thinkable rather than being 
possible. I have suggested in effect that a proposition < God is F > is think-
ables just if it does not violate logic, mathematics or “secular” necessary 
truths. If we treat Anselm’s reasoning as in effect covertly involving (14), 
we can also see a reason for what is otherwise puzzling—that no claim 
that possibly God has the attribute in question figures in the reasoning 
Proslogion 5 sketches. This may be because PBT as a vehicle of modal 
discovery is guided by what is thinkables. Anselm has to restrict what is 
thinkablen to what is possible, but in PBT it is thinkables levels of divine 
greatness that tell us what the possible levels of greatness are. However, 
the claim that God is the greatest possible being still has a role to play. It 
might well be thinkables that something surpass God: if we take the non-
theological part of modal space as fixed, it seems an open option to fill the 
theological bit with something that passes the (13)-test but surpasses God. 
Anselm’s axiom rules that move out. It tells us that whatever we thinks, 
the thinkables perfections of God are the summit of possible perfection, 
and anything over that summit, if thinkables, does not come out possible 
or thinkablen.
Finally, let us consider the counterpossible problem. Here I want to 
distinguish conditionals true only as an artefact of the semantics and con-
ditionals that also have substantive grounds for truth. As an artefact of 
the semantics, that God is not F entails that God has every conceivable 
level of perfection. But our intuitions tell us that God’s not being F also 
has a substantive connection with some level(s). For instance, where F is 
omnipotence, not being F is having any lesser degree of power, and so 
intuition tells us that the “level” of greatness associated with not being F is 
actually an interval of levels open toward omnipotence’s level and closed 
on the low end by zero. We are reasonable in focusing on what intuition 
directs us to in doing philosophical theology, and ignoring the alterna-
tives. This amounts to reasoning with what is plausible rather than what 
is implausible, and with what seems to us to reflect the relevant facts in 
the area in question, as the connection between no minds and no thoughts 
does. We ought to respect the relevant facts, and we do so by reasoning 
only with conditionals that respect them.
I suggest, then, that PBT weathers the storm Speaks raises for it.
Oriel College, Oxford University
